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Who Suffered Antitrust Injury in the
Microsoft Case?
John E. Lopatka* & William H. Page**
I.

Introduction

In United States v. Microsoft Corp.,' the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia ("District Court") held that the software giant violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by crushing a competitive threat to
the monopoly held by its Windows operating system. The District Court
pointed to various means Microsoft used to prevent Netscape's Navigator
web browser and Sun Microsystems's Java technology from developing into a
competitor of Windows as a platform for which developers could write
software applications. 2 The remedy was essentially the one proposed by the
government:3 imposing on Microsoft a variety of conduct restrictions 4 and
ordering it split into two firms, one limited to operating systems software and
the other to applications software.5 After this symposium, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit") issued
its decision, affirming most of the District Court's findings with respect to
monopoly maintenance, but reversing the holdings on attempted monopolization and tying and on the remedy.6 The D.C. Circuit's decision does not
substantially affect our analysis of the antitrust injury issues likely to ensue in
private litigation, but we refer to particularly important aspects of the decision occasionally in footnotes.
Most of the popular and scholarly discussions of Microsoft have focused
on whether the defendant violated the law and, if so, whether the remedial
* Alumni Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law, lopatka@law.sc.
edu.
** Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar, University of Florida College of Law, page@law.
ufl.edu. Professor Page has been a consultant to Microsoft Corp. Microsoft Corp. did not sponsor the research for this paper, and the views expressed here do not necessarily represent the
views of Microsoft Corp.
1 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions of
Law), aff'd in part, rev'd in part per curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
2 Id. at 39-54.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62 (D.D.C. 2000) (Memorandum and Order), affjd in par4 rev'd in partper curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001) ("Plaintiffs won the case, and for that reason alone have some
entitlement to a remedy of their choice."). The litigation against Microsoft was the consolidation
of a case brought by the United States and one pursued by nineteen states. Microsoft, 87 F.
Supp. 2d at 35. For simplicity, we refer to the plaintiffs in these cases as "the government."
4 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 65-71. Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson stayed the final
judgment pending disposition of Microsoft's appeal. United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No.
98-1232 (D.D.C. June 20, 2000) (order staying judgment).
5 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 64-65 (Memorandum and Order).
6 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (en banc),
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
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order was appropriate. 7 Never far from the surface in all of these discussions,
however, has been the prospect of private antitrust suits that would inevitably follow a government victory. Indeed, numerous consumer class actions
were filed against Microsoft in the wake of the District Court's issuance of its
findings of fact.8 Should the District Court's decisions on liability stand,
Microsoft can expect to face other suits by a variety of actors, including competitors, original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs"), internet businesses,
and perhaps others.
In this article, we offer a preliminary analysis of some of the issues that
would frame the private damage litigation. We have to be selective because
there are so many potential classes of plaintiffs, each with many possible theories of recovery. As a further complication, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson's findings and conclusions naturally focus on the existence of violations
and only incidentally on their effects on particular actors; still less do they
discuss other causal factors that may have affected the fortunes of various
actors. Consequently, there are numerous gaps in the findings that private
plaintiffs will have to fill in order to recover treble damages. To make our
task manageable, we will focus on the prospects of consumers, OEMs, and
competitors, particularly Netscape (now owned by America Online), for recovering treble damages. 9 More specifically, we will consider how the anti-

trust injury doctrine might shape any future damage models for these
potential plaintiffs.
7 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, PreservingCompetition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1 (1999); Thomas W. Hazlett,
Microsoft's Internet Exploration: Predatoryor Competitive?, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 29
(1999). For our recent work, see John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Devising a Microsoft
Remedy that Serves Consumers, 9 GEo. MASON L. REV. 691 (2001); John E. Lopatka & William
H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and the Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 Sup.
CT. ECON. REv. 157 (1999); William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, The Dubious Searchfor "Integration" in the Microsoft Trial, 31 CoNN. L. REv. 1251, 1265-69 (1999); John E. Lopatka &
William H. Page, An Offer Netscape Couldn't Refuse?: The Antitrust Implications of Microsoft's
Proposal,44 ANrrrusT BULL. 679 (1999).
8 See, e.g., Antitrust Class Actions Filed Against Microsoft, TECH LAW JOURNAL, Dec. 1,
1999, at http:/techlawjournal.comlatr/19991201.htm. The United States District Court for the
District of Maryland recently dismissed a number of consumer class actions based on federal
antitrust law. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2001). Some
state class actions have been dismissed as well. See MIcROsoIr COR'POArION, CLASS AcrIoN
LAwsurrs, at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/legal/cal (last modified Feb. 19, 2001) (listing
states that have granted motions to dismiss); see also Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and PrivateLawyering in Mass
Litigation, 34 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1, 6-9 (2000) (noting class actions filed against Microsoft).
Microsoft recently proposed to settle more than 100 class actions by providing computers and
software to public schools in low-income neighborhoods, but the outcome of the proposed resolution was unclear at the time of this writing. See Steve Lohr, Microsoft Aims To Settle Suits By
Equipping 12,500 Schools, N.Y. Tnims, Nov. 21, 2001, at C1.
9 Sun Microsystems is another potential antitrust plaintiff. Its recent settlement of copyright litigation with Microsoft specifically reserved antitrust claims, "including such claims as
may be based in whole or in part on some or all of the facts underlying any of the claims released
and dismissed in" the copyright case. Sun Microsystems, Inc. & Microsoft Corp., Settlement
Agreement and Mutual Limited Release, 17(b) (Jan. 23, 2001), http://www.sun.com/2001-01231
audiocast/announcement.html.
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This focus on antitrust injury conveniently allows us to bypass a number
of difficult issues, including Illinois Brick's prohibition of most suits by indirect purchasers in federal court 0 and the problems of certifying class actions
in those state courts that permit indirect purchaser suits.'1 However, it does
allow us to discuss broader policy issues raised by the treble damage action.
This Symposium asks whether the treble damage action is effective as a deterrent. The antitrust injury doctrine reminds us that effectiveness does not
mean imposing an arbitrarily high penalty; it means insuring the penalty is at
the right level, given the goals of the antitrust laws. That question requires
courts deciding damage issues to measure the plaintiffs' damage theory
against the goals of antitrust.
We begin in Part II with a brief overview of the antitrust injury doctrine
and some related rules affecting antitrust damages. We emphasize the importance of the measure of the effect of a practice on competition in defining the
scope of antitrust injury. The most reliable measure is the immediate effect
of the practice on output and prices. But the liability ruling in Microsoft is
based on a more elusive ground-harm to the competitive process measured
by reduced innovation. If that rationale is upheld, it will affect the definition
of antitrust injury. In Part III, we survey the actions of Microsoft, both anticompetitive and procompetitive, as found by the District Court. Finally, in
Part IV, we examine how the antitrust injury doctrine might apply to the
various effects that Microsoft's actions had on consumers, OEMs, and
Netscape.
I1. Antitrust Injury and the Meaning of Harm to Competition
A court's determination of antitrust liability does not necessarily mean
anyone can recover treble damages. 12 Any action under section 4 of the
Clayton Act must overcome a variety of additional hurdles. First, like all
damage actions, antitrust suits must meet the applicable standards of proof of
individual harm.13 Moreover, even if an actor had suffered provable harm as
a result of the offense, it must meet the requirements of antitrust injury and
standing. 14 Antitrust law has set limits on the scope of liability because actions that violate antitrust law may have both efficient and inefficient consequences, and those consequences may be felt, directly or indirectly, by a
multitude of economic actors. The antitrust injury doctrine requires that private harms be linked to the inefficiency associated with a practice.15 Anti-

1o 111.
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977); see also supra note 8.
11 William H. Page, The Limits of State Indirect PurchaserSuits: Class Certification in the
Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 ANTrrrnusT L.J. 1 (1999).
12 Ind. Grocery Co. v. Super VaIu Stores, 864 F.2d 1409, 1419 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that

a per se violation "does not by itself bestow on any plaintiff a private right of action for
damages").
13 See generally Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, "Speculative" Antitrust Damages, 70
WASH. L. R-v. 423, 432-35 (1995).
14 See generally William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN.
L. REv. 1445, 1483-85 (1985).
15 Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328,344 (1990) ("The antitrust injury

requirement ensures that a plaintiff can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the defendant's behavior.").
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trust standing imposes a further limitation, restricting the right to sue to those
who are best situated to recover, taking into account the public interest in
efficient antitrust enforcement. 16 Although the standing inquiry involves the
weighing of a number of factors, antitrust injury is not one of them; antitrust
17
injury is an essential element of any private antitrust case.
Our focus in this Part is on the antitrust injury inquiry. The doctrine
traces its origin to Brunswick, Inc. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,18 in which the
Supreme Court required treble damage plaintiffs to prove "antitrust injury,
which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent
and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury
should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of the anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation."' 19
The doctrine expresses the Court's recognition that complex business
practices-even ones that overstep antitrust prohibitions-have a variety of
dimensions only some of which are matters of antitrust concern. To assure
that antitrust damages are linked to the goals of antitrust, the antitrust injury
doctrine requires that the asserted harm be "attributable to an anti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny. '20 The doctrine "ensures that the
harm claimed by the plaintiff corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of the antitrust laws in the first place, and it prevents losses that stem
from competition from supporting suits by private plaintiffs for either damz
ages or equitable relief."'
Identifying antitrust injury necessarily involves, first, identifying the
harm to competition associated with the practice-the reason for imposing
liability-then determining whether the alleged private harm has the requisite causal link to the rationale for liability. The first step in this process is
critical because the court's definition of harm to competition will in part determine which private harms it will find to be linked to the anticompetitive
aspect of the practice at issue. We believe that the most reliable measure of
harm to competition is the effect of the practice on price and output.22 Be16 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.

519, 543-45 (1983).
17 See, e.g., In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1166 (3d Cir.
1993) (observing that "antitrust injury is more than a component to be factored in a standing
analysis, it must be present in every case"); T.O. Bell v. Dow Chem. Co., 847 F.2d 1179, 1182
(5th Cir. 1988) ("Proving antitrust injury is a necessary requirement for proving standing; the
former cannot stand alone from the latter."); see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479
U.S. 104, 110 n.5 (1986) ("A showing of antitrust injury is necessary, but not always sufficient, to
establish standing under § 4 because a party may have suffered antitrust injury but may not be a
proper party under § 4 for other reasons.").

18 Brunswick, Inc. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
19 Id. at 489 n14.
20 Atd. Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 334.
21 Id. at 342. The Court added that "procompetitive or efficiency-enhancing aspects of
practices that nominally violate the antitrust laws may cause serious harm to individuals, but this
kind of harm is the essence of competition and should play no role in the definition of antitrust
damages." Id. at 344 (citation omitted).
22 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104-07 (1984) ("Restrictions on price and output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade"); Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that a practice harms
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cause antitrust is intended to protect consumers, it makes sense to ask up
front whether the practice harms consumers by restricting output and raising
prices.3 If such an effect is present, then harm to the plaintiff is antitrust
injury if it is causally linked to that effect.
By this measure of harm to competition, a successful cartel's overcharge
to the purchaser is obviously antitrust injury because it has the necessary
causal link to the output restriction and the price increase. 24 Exclusionary
practices can also impose antitrust injury if, for example, they succeed in reducing output and increasing prices to consumers, either by raising the costs
of rivals or by driving them from the market entirely. In such cases, consumers who pay the overcharge suffer antitrust injury, as do the violator's rivals
because the exclusion of their output from the market is the mechanism of
the overcharge. 25 It bears emphasis, however, that this sort of anticompetitive exclusion must be distinguished from the sort of exclusion inflicted by
competition itself, which plainly does not stem from any output restriction.
Brunswick shows that competitors harmed simply by an increase in output
(or the maintenance of existing output) do not suffer antitrust injury, even if
the increase is the result of an unlawful practice. 26 Likewise, in Atlantic Richfield, the Court stated that
[w]hen a firm, or even a group of firms adhering to a vertical agreement, lowers prices but maintains them above predatory levels, the
business lost by rivals cannot be viewed as an "anticompetitive"
consequence of the claimed violation.... This is not antitrustinjury;
indeed, "cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very
essence of competition." 27
In sum, not all injuries caused by an antitrust violation are antitrust injury;
they must also be caused by a reduction in competition.
competition if it "obstructs the achievement of competition's basic goals-lower prices, better
products, and more efficient production methods").
23 As one court observed, "antitrust injury occurs only when the claimed injury flows from
acts harmful to consumers." Rebel Oil Co. v. At. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1445 (9th Cir.

1995); see also Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999)
("The antitrust laws do not provide a remedy to every party injured by unlawful economic conduct. It is well established that the antitrust laws are only intended to preserve competition for
the benefit of consumers."); Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826

F.2d 1235, 1241 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Mindful that antitrust law aims to protect competition, not
competitors, we must analyze the antitrust injury question from the viewpoint of the
consumer.").
24 Of course, an undercharge by a buyers' cartel would impose the same sort of antitrust
injury. See Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2000).
25 See, e.g., Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 962, 982-83

(E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff airline suffered antitrust violation from agreement
restricting its ability to compete for customers based on the allowable size of carry-on baggage).
See generally William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Penaltiesand Competitors' Injury, 88 MicH. L.

R-v. 2151, 2162-64 (1990).
26 Brunswick, Inc. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
27 Atd. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 337-38 (1990) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)).
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Harm to competition might be defined more broadly than the effect of
the practice on price and output.28 Some have suggested that competition is
harmed where a practice interferes with a market process that is necessary to
effective competition or "competition on the merits. '2 9 For example, "trader
freedom" is sometimes said to be a measure of true competition. 0 Such a
definition of harm to competition would, of course, lead to a broader scope
of antitrust injury. For example, a trader whose freedom was impaired by an
illegal exclusive contract or by some other form of coercion might argue that
it suffered antitrust injury.
One might justify the focus on harm to the competitive process if courts
could confidently identify essential elements of that process. For example, if
impeding one element of the competitive process would predictably lead to
reduced output within a reasonably short time, it would make sense to prohibit a practice having that effect. It might also make sense to impose a deterrent penalty even at a relatively early stage of the offense. But it is
extraordinarily difficult to separate harmful from neutral and beneficial practices based upon some aspect of their nature that is predicted to lead to an
output restriction in the long run. When a practice immediately reduces output, that effect is a reliable guide in conducting the damage inquiry. However, when the effect on output is predicted to occur in the future, penalizing
the practice threatens to deter beneficial conduct. Consequently, we suggest
that courts should proceed cautiously in identifying practices that harm the
competitive process, particularly when they provide immediate benefits to
consumers.
Predatory pricing is a useful illustration of the importance of defining
the relevant harm to competition in the analysis of antitrust injury. Even
under the narrower definition of harm to competition-the effect on price
and output-true predatory pricing that successfully excludes a competitor
causes antitrust injury both to consumers who pay an overcharge and to the
excluded competitors who lose profits as a result of being driven from the
market. But what about unsuccessful predatory pricing-price-cutting that
28 The D.C. Circuit in Microsoft apparently endorsed the broader definition of harm to
competition by affirming the holding of monopoly maintenance, even though the government
did not present direct proof that Microsoft's conduct actually reinforced its monopoly power.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 78-79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (en banc).
This "edentulous" standard of causation imposes liability for bad acts, not for proven effects on
competition.
29 See Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1101 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[O]verall
consumer preferences in setting output and prices is more important than higher prices and
lower output, per se, in determining whether there has been an injury to competition." (citing
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984))).
30 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (condemning maximum resale price fixing because it "cripple[s] the freedom of traders and thereby
restrain[s] their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment"). In Khan v. State Oil Co.,
93 F.3d 1358, 1364 (7th Cir. 1996), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
opined that the Supreme Court "may... think that interfering with the freedom of a dealer to
raise prices may cause antitrust injury," even though it "does not impair any interest that the
antitrust laws interpreted in light of modem economics could be thought to protect." On review,
the Supreme Court held that maximum resale price fixing is not illegal per se and so did not
address the antitrust injury issue. State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997).
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meets the standards of predation but does not actually exclude a competitor?
Under the narrower definition of harm to competition, losses a rival suffers
during the predatory campaign should not be viewed as flowing from a reduction in competition. In actual litigation, regardless of the standard for
predation adopted, predatory pricing looks very much like procompetitive
price-cutting, particularly from the consumer's perspective. 31 As the Supreme Court observed in Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., "[a]lthough unsuccessful predatory pricing may encourage some
inefficient substitution toward the product being sold at less than its cost,
unsuccessful predation is in general a boon to consumers. '32 The Court thus
subordinated predatory pricing's short-run resource misallocations to the immediate benefit to consumers in lower prices and higher output. One court
has therefore inferred that "[b]ecause below-cost pricing is a 'boon to consumers,' the losses inflicted on [the plaintiff] by the pricing are not the stuff
'33
of antitrust injury.
The analysis of antitrust injury from unsuccessful predatory pricing
changes if harm to competition is defined more broadly to include harm to
the competitive process. Some have argued that the losses a targeted rival
suffers during a predatory pricing campaign are antitrust injury because the
injury is connected to the resource misallocation associated with below-cost
pricing.34 Indeed, in Brunswick itself, the Court wrote that "[t]he short-term
effect of certain anticompetitive behavior-predatory below-cost pricing, for
example-may be to stimulate price competition. But competitors may be
able to prove antitrust injury before they actually are driven from the market
and competition is thereby lessened. '35 The rationale is that predatory pricing harms the competitive process, even though it does not immediately re31 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, PredatoryStrategies and Counterstrategies,48 U. CHI. L.

REv. 263,266 (1981) ("[lt is exceedingly difficult to distinguish 'predatory' strategies from ordinary competition."); see also Steams Airport Equip. Co., Inc. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 527
(5th Cir. 1999) (noting that the "central difficulty with [predatory pricing] actions is that the
conduct alleged is difficult to distinguish from conduct that benefits consumers"); United States
v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1196 (D. Kan. 2001) ("[I]dentifying [price predation based

on measures other than cost] in the particular case without chilling aggressive, competitive pricing is far beyond the capacity of any antitrust tribunal.").
32 Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1995).
33 Rebel Oil Co. v. At. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1444 (9th Cir. 1995). "Predatory

but do not
pricing schemes that fail at the recoupment stage may injure specific competitors ....
injure competition (i.e. they do not injure consumers) and so produce no antitrust injury."
Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1200 (3d Cir. 1995).
34 Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1539,

1561-1565 (1989) (arguing that unsuccessful predatory efforts cause "antitrust injury" even
though consumers have not suffered).
35 Brunswick, Inc. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 n.14 (1977). The Court
added: "Of course, the case for relief will be strongest where competition has been diminished."

Id; see also Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1508 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Losses a competitor suffers
as a result of predatory pricing is a form of antitrust injury because predatory pricing has the

requisite anticompetitive effect against competitors." (quotation omitted)); In re Air Passenger
Computer Reservation Sys., 727 F. Supp. 564, 568-69 (C.D. Cal. 1989) ("[W]hen defendants
engage in predatory pricing or other anticompetitive acts in an attempt to gain a monopoly, the
competitor who is being driven out of the market is the party with standing.").
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duce output because it may lead to harm to consumers at some point in the
future.
The problem of defining harm to competition also dominates the analysis of practices that allegedly harm innovation-a critical issue in Microsoft.
In 1999, a district court observed that "no court yet has addressed" the question of "whether private plaintiffs may sue for an artificial constraint on innovation. '36 This year, however, a different district court suggested that
"[s]ince businesses compete through both lower prices and superior performance, a firm's stifling of innovative products would cause antitrust injury." 37
In theory, of course, the latter statement must be true, if the defendant actually stifles innovation. Suppression of innovation by agreement among competitors could be tantamount to a cartel's output restriction, if the innovation
forgone would have resulted in lower product prices. Exclusion of an innovation by anticompetitive means could be tantamount to exclusion of a more
efficient competing firm. The issue becomes far more problematic, however,
if the claim is that the defendant's acts tend to harm innovation. Perhaps
even more than predatory pricing, harm to innovation is easily claimed but
difficult for courts to identify. As we argue elsewhere, because economists
do not have a determinate theory of the process of innovation, claims of
harm to innovation are intrinsically more speculative than other forms of asserted monopolization. 38 If a court were to condemn a practice as tending to
harm innovation, the problems of sorting out and proving antitrust injury
would be challenging.
A final implication of antitrust injury has particular importance in
Microsoft. If a practice has both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects,
any damage theory must disaggregate them. 39 According to one
commentator,
unless the plaintiff provides disaggregated damage proof, it may be
impossible for the finder of fact to tailor its damage award to address only those injuries that flow from conduct it has determined to
be anticompetitive. Disaggregation thus facilitates the application of
the antitrust injury doctrine as a substantive limitation on the recov40
ery of antitrust damages.
Thus, if the defendant has harmed the plaintiff by both legitimate competitive practices and by inefficient practices, the plaintiffs damage theory must
Glen Holly Entm't, Inc. v. Tektronix, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711 (D. Md. 2001) (concluding that the plaintiffs could not establish antitrust standing).
38 John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 367, 370-71 (2001).
39 See, e.g., MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1162 (7th Cir. 1983) ("When a plaintiff improperly attributes all losses to a defendant's illegal acts, despite the presence of significant other
factors, the evidence does not permit a jury to make a reasonable and principled estimate of the
amount of damage."); see also City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1371-72 (9th
Cir. 1992); United States Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1378-79 (2d
36
37

Cir. 1988).
40

M. Sean Royall, Disaggregationof Antitrust Damages, 65 AlrRus'r L.J. 311, 323

(1997).
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sort out the effects. Similarly, if some practices actually benefited the plaintiff, those effects must be subtracted from any harm.
III. Microsoft's Conduct and Its Effects
The discussion to this point has shown that to constitute antitrust injury,
the plaintiff's harm has to be causally connected to a reduction in competition, however it is defined. Thus, identifying antitrust injury requires an assessment of the effects of the defendant's conduct not only on the plaintiff,
but also on others and on competition generally. Though much of what
Judge Jackson had to say in the findings of fact and conclusions of law dealt
with harms that Microsoft's conduct inflicted on others, he also identified
beneficial effects. 41 Many questions remain, but the District Court's findings
and conclusions allow at least a preliminary assessment of their net effects on
both competition and specific economic actors.
A.

The Competitive Context

Judge Jackson held that Microsoft has monopoly power in the world
market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems42 largely because it has a
dominant market share that is protected by network effects 43 or "the applications barrier to entry." 44 Developers want to write applications for the most
widely-used operating system, and users want to buy the operating system for
which the most applications are available. 45 Consequently, far more applications have been written for Windows than for other operating systems,46 and
users tend to choose Windows and stay with it-a phenomenon that disadvantages smaller competitors and new entrants.
Netscape's Navigator web browser threatened to undermine the applications barrier, according to the District Court, by providing a new form of
platform to which applications could be written. It was a form of "middleware" that exposed applications programming interfaces ("APIs") to
which applications could be written instead of to the operating system. 47 Indeed, once an application was written to Navigator, it would run regardless of
the operating system, a fact that led Bill Gates famously to worry that Net41 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46, 102 (D.D.C. 1999)
(Findings of Fact

186, 408), affd in part, rev'd in partper curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.

Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
42 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions
of Law), affd in part,rev'd in partper curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
43 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 10-11 (Findings of Fact 39) (describing "positive network

effects").
44 Id. at 37.
45 Id. at 10-11 (Findings of Fact
36-42) (describing "positive feedback loop"). Judge
Jackson found that "[t]he overwhelming majority of consumers will only use a PC operating

system for which there already exists a large and varied set of high-quality, full-featured applications, and for which it seems relatively certain that new types of applications and new versions of
existing applications will continue to be marketed at pace with those written for other operating

systems." Id. at 9 (Findings of Fact 30).
46 Id. at 12, 13-14 (Findings of Fact
40, 47).
47 Id. at 19-20 (Findings of Fact
68-69).
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scape threatened "to commoditize the underlying operating system. '48 Sun
Microsystems's Java technology was also a form of middleware because it
purportedly allowed developers to write programs that would run on any operating system, so long as the computer could read Java bytecode or carried a
Java virtual machine to interpret the Java instructions for the operating system.49 This prospect also threatened Microsoft,50 in part because each copy
of Netscape's browser included a Java virtual machine.5 1
B. Microsoft's Actions
Microsoft responded to the competitive threat posed by Netscape and
Java in a variety of ways. Some of the responses, both the court and the
government acknowledge, were lawful and beneficial to consumers. For example, Microsoft introduced its Internet Explorer ("IE") browser and devoted enormous resources to improving it.52 In these efforts it was successful:
most computer journalists that have reviewed the competing browsers have
found that IE is as good as or better than Navigator.5 3 Moreover, Microsoft
included IE with Windows at no increment in cost and provided it free as an
upgrade through other channels.5 4 The District Court specifically found that
these actions by themselves had beneficial effects.5 5 Netscape was selling a
fairly rudimentary browser in 1995 for a positive price; after Microsoft's actions, browsers were free.
The District Court, however, held that some of Microsoft's attacks on
the new platform threat were unlawful. The first effort to subvert Netscape,
according to the court, was Microsoft's "market division proposal" to Netscape.5 6 In a 1995 meeting, Microsoft officials tried to convince Netscape to
develop its browser only for non-Windows operating systems, leaving the
Windows 95 market to Microsoft.5 7 Microsoft offered to provide preferential
access to technical information if Netscape agreed to the terms, but it
threatened to delay or deny access to necessary technical information if Net48 Id. at 19-20 (Findings of Fact
69, 72).
49 Id. at 20 (Findings of Fact 1 73, 74).
50 As the District Court put it, "middleware threatened to demolish Microsoft's coveted
monopoly power." United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions of Law), aff'd in part, rev'd in part per curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
51 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 21 (Findings of Fact 76).
52 Id. at 35 (Findings of Fact 135).
53 See, e.g., Walter S. Mossberg, Microsoft's Browser Continues to Beat Old and New Rivals, WALL ST. J. INrrni~crivE ED. (Feb.15, 2001), at http://interactive.wsj.comlarchivelretrieve.
cgi?id982187031650146206.djm&template=doclink.tmpl.
54 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (Findings of Fact
136-137).

55 Id. at 46 (Findings of Fact 1 186) ("As an abstract and general proposition, many if not
most consumers can be said to benefit from Microsoft's provision of Web browsing functionality

with its Windows operating system at no additional charge.").
56 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 45-46 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions
of Law), affd in part, rev'd in partper curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S.Ct. 350 (2001). The incident related solely to the attempted monopolization claim.
57 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 22-24 (Findings of Fact IT 79-89).
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scape did not agree.58 Netscape declined the proposal and suffered the delay
in obtaining the technical information.5 9
The District Court found that when Microsoft's attempt to co-opt Netscape failed, Microsoft set out to thwart the middleware menace by limiting
consumers' access to Navigator, most significantly by choking off the best
channels for distribution of Netscape-through OEMs and Internet access
providers ("IAPs"). 60 Microsoft constricted the OEM channel by a variety of
methods. First, it "bound" Windows and 1E both contractually and technologically and did not provide either a version of Windows without IE or a
61 The early licenses of Windows 95 prohibited
ready means of removing IE.
OEMs from deleting IE before they shipped new computers to consumers. 62
Microsoft later "bound" IE to Windows 95 by placing its code in files that
provided the traditional functions of an operating system. 63 Those shared
files could not then be deleted without crippling Windows.6a Microsoft did,
however, allow users to disable access to IE in Windows 95 by using the
"Add/Remove Programs" control panel. 65 With the introduction of IE 4.0
and Windows 98, however, Microsoft included the browsing code in more
shared files 66 and eliminated the users' ability to delete access to IE in this
67
way.
Second, Microsoft imposed restrictions on OEMs' ability to customize
the Windows desktop or the initial "boot" sequence to facilitate users' access
to Navigator. 68 OEMs could not, for example, remove the IE icon and other
ways of launching IE69 or alter the boot sequence to promote Navigator
before the user reached the Windows desktop. 70 They were not allowed to
install programs promoting Navigator that would launch automatically after
Id. at 23 (Findings of Fact 84).
Id.at 24-25 (Findings of Fact
90-92). The D.C. Circuit reversed the District Court's
conclusion that Microsoft attempted to monopolize the browser market through this offer and
other acts, holding that the government failed to define the browser market or show that it was
protected by entry barriers. United States v. icrosoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,80-84 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(per curiam) (en bane).
60 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
61 Id. at 39, 49-50. The practice was relevant to the claim that Microsoft illegally maintained monopoly power in operating systems, id. at 39, the claim that Microsoft attempted to
monopolize the browser market, id. at 45, and the tying claim, id. at 49-51. The court found that
the practice harmed competition without a justification. Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 46 (Findings of Fact 186) ("No consumer benefit can be ascribed, however, to Microsoft's refusal to
offer a version of Windows 95 or Windows 98 without Internet Explorer, or to Microsoft's refusal to provide a method for uninstalling Internet Explorer from Windows 98.").
62 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41.
63 Id. at 41.
58
59

64
65
66
67
68

L

1d.at 42.
Id. at 43.

Id.

Id. at 39. This conduct was relevant to the monopoly maintenance and attempted monopolization claims and, to a limited extent, the tying claim.
69 United States v. icrosoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 50 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact
203), aff'd in part, rev'd in partper curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,122

S. Ct. 350 (2001).
70

Id.; see also id. at 51 (Findings of Fact

209).
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the initial Windows boot sequence 7' or to add icons for Navigator that were
bigger than IE's.72 Microsoft also extended carrots to OEMs who favored IE
and brandished sticks at those who favored Netscape. 73 For example, if
OEMs set IE as the default browser, they paid reduced royalties and received
marketing assistance. 74 If they favored Netscape, they faced loss of assistance and subsidized competition from Microsoft-friendly OEMs. 75
Microsoft constricted the IAP channel in comparable ways. 76 First, it
gave free licenses to IAPs for IE and its so-called Access Kit.77 A few large

IAPs who agreed to promote IE over Navigator won places in the Windows
95 Referral Server, through which users could subscribe to the LAP by clicking on the Internet Connection Wizard on the Windows 95 desktop. 78 A few
online services, including America Online ("AOL"), that agreed to promote
IE exclusively won still more conspicuous promotion by placement on the
Windows desktop. 79 Microsoft also favored ten large IAPs who tried to persuade existing subscribers to switch to software that was bundled with IE.80
Microsoft indirectly hindered distribution of Navigator through the
OEM and IAP channels in its dealings with Apple, Internet content providers ("ICPs"), and independent software vendors ("ISVs"). 81 It threatened to
abandon Microsoft Office for the Macintosh operating system, a critical application for Apple, unless Apple made IE the default browser for the Macintosh.82 Microsoft also gave free IE licenses and other benefits to induce some

ICPs and ISVs not to write applications to Netscape's APIs. 83

Id at 52 (Findings of Fact
211, 213).
Id. (Findings of Fact 213).
73 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
74 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 58-60 (Findings of Fact
230-238).
75 Id. at 58-59 (Findings of Fact
232, 236-37).
76 Microsoft,87 F. Supp. 2d at 41. The conduct was relevant to the monopoly maintenance
and attempted monopolization claims.
77 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 62-63 (Findings of Fact
250-51). The D.C. Circuit reversed this finding of liability on the grounds that offering services at an attractive but nonpredatory price was not anticompetitive. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 67-68 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (en banc).
78 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 63-64 (Findings of Fact 91l253-58). These IAPs could not
promote Navigator or provide Navigator to customers who did not specifically request it, and
their distribution of Navigator could not exceed a given percentage of their total browser distribution, usually twenty-five percent. Id.
79 Id. at 68-77 (Findings of Fact
272-306). The District Court used the term "Internet
access provider" to encompass online services and Internet service providers. Id. at 5 (Findings
of Fact 15).
80 Id. at 64-65 (Findings of Fact
259-60).
81 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 42-43. These measures related to the monopoly maintenance and attempted monopolization claims.
82 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 85-89 (Findings of Fact
341-56).
83 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 42-43; Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 84-85 (Findings of Fact
334-35, 340). The D.C. Circuit held that Microsoft's deals with ISVs, but not ICPs, supported
liability. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 71-72 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (en
banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
71

72
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Finally, Microsoft took a number of steps to hinder the portability of
programs written in Java,8 4 particularly through its own, Windows-specific,
implementation of Java.85 Microsoft tried to persuade ISVs to use
Microsoft's Java technology, by offering benefits, but also by making the
Microsoft Java implementation superior.86 The District Court also held that
Microsoft persuaded Intel to abandon technology that would have helped
cross-platform Java implementations. 87
C. Competitive Effects
The first step in the analysis of antitrust injury is to determine the extent
to which the defendant's conduct harmed or enhanced competition. This issue turns out to be unusually complicated in Microsoft. First, whether the
known effects constitute a harm to competition depends to a large extent on
which definition of harm to competition one adopts. As we argued above in
our discussion of antitrust injury, the most tangible indicator of harm to competition is an immediate reduction in output and an increase in prices.
Others suggest that harm to some aspect of the competitive process can constitute harm to competition.88 Judge Jackson appeared to apply both definitions at different points in both the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law, but he primarily relied on the latter definition. This standard is apparent
in his statements that Microsoft was a "predacious" monopolizer that did
"violence ... to the competitive process," 89 and that Microsoft "mounted a

deliberate assault upon entrepreneurial efforts... [and] placed an oppressive
thumb on the scale of competitive fortune." 90
Whatever the legal definition, however, it is factually difficult to sort out
the effects of Microsoft's good and bad practices in either the near or long
term. Just as the District Court found that some of Microsoft's responses to
the platform threat were legitimate and some not, it found that some of
Microsoft's actions were beneficial to competition and others harmful.
1. Prices and Output
Although the District Court made some findings about the effects of
Microsoft's conduct on price and output, Judge Jackson did not rely on them
in his conclusion that Microsoft had reduced competition. We survey those
findings here because they are crucial to proof of some types of harm. To
summarize at the outset, while the findings are unclear about whether and to
84 Microsoft,87 F. Supp. 2d at 43. This conduct relates primarily to the monopoly maintenance charge.
85 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 96-97 (Findings of Fact 1 387-90).
86 Id. at 98-101 (Findings of Fact 911
395-402).
87 Id. (Findings of Fact 1 396, 404-06). The District Court also suggested that some other
firms, like Intel, were coerced into abandoning efforts to expose their own APIs, which would
have made them platform competitors. See, e.g., id. at 25-26 (Findings of Fact 9194-101).
88 See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 503, 504 (2001) ("[Ihe antitrust laws aim to permit and preserve a sufficient,
although not a perfect, array of options from which consumers may choose.").
89 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 44.

90 Id.
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what extent Microsoft's prices exceed a competitive price, they clearly do not
hold that Microsoft has charged a higher price for Windows as a result of the
actions at issue in the case. To the contrary, the District Court found that
Microsoft has charged less than a rational competitive firm would charge,
particularly for the browser, as part of its overall strategy to gain usage share.
Only if Microsoft was so successful in this strategy that it deterred entry of
better and less expensive platforms could one find an overcharge-a conclusion that Judge Jackson was unwilling to reach.
Even though the District Court held that Microsoft had monopoly
power, it did not specifically hold that Microsoft charged a monopoly price
for Windows. The District Court found that "[i]t is not possible with the
available data to determine with any level of confidence whether the price
that a profit-maximizing firm with monopoly power would charge for Windows 98 comports with the price that Microsoft actually charges." 91 Instead,
it rested its determination of monopoly power on Microsoft's market share
and the existence of an applications barrier to entry, which denied consumers
a reasonable alternative to Windows. 92
The failure to find that Microsoft was charging a monopoly price was not
fatal to the finding of monopoly power, according to the District Court because "if [Microsoft] wished to exercise [its] power solely in terms of price, it
could charge a price for Windows substantially above that which could be
charged in a competitive market. '93 Moreover, this power was not effectively constrained by competitors' prices, 94 the threat of piracy, 95 its own installed base, 96 or more long-term threats. 97 Microsoft thus could raise prices
without attracting immediate new entry 9s or inducing OEMs to switch to
other suppliers. 99
The District Court offered two explanations for Microsoft's failure to
charge a monopoly price. First, it speculated that Microsoft's strategy might
be to "stimulat[e] the growth of the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems by keeping the price of Windows low today."'1 This explanation
would be consistent with Microsoft's observed behavior in software markets
generally. 1 1 More important, it suggested that Microsoft chose to exercise
its monopoly power in part by inducing OEMs to consent to burdensome
91 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (Findings of Fact 65).
92 Id. at 10 (Findings of Fact 1 34).
93 Id. (Findings of Fact
33); see also id. at 5, 15-16 (Findings of Fact
94 Id. at 16 (Findings of Fact
55).
95 Id. (Findings of Fact
96 Id. (Findings of Fact
97 Id. (Findings of Fact

18, 54, 55).

57).
58).
59).

98 Id. at 10-11 (Findings of Fact 36).
99 Id. at 15-16 (Findings of Fact 54).
100 Id. at 18 (Findings of Fact 65). The District Court added that "[b]y pricing low relative
to the short-run profit-maximizing price, thereby focusing on attracting new users to the Windows platform, Microsoft would also intensify the positive network effects that add to the impenetrability of the applications barrier to entry." Id.
101 STAN J. LlEBowrrz & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MIcRosoFT. COMPETITION AND ANTRlUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY

154-156 (1999)

(offering data that Microsoft

pursues a low-price strategy for all software).
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restrictions-a point that becomes crucial in the evaluation of whether
OEMs suffered antitrust injury, as we will see below. 0 2 The District Court's
observation recognizes the fallacy of double counting-that a monopolist
cannot both charge a monopoly price and impose costly restrictions on its
customers. 0 3 It did not, however, quantify the cost of the restrictions, nor
did it find that the restrictions were purely exclusionary. Judge Jackson
found that the restrictions tended to reinforce the applications barrier but not
necessarily in an inefficient way.
The District Court never conceded that Microsoft was charging a competitive price. It found that Microsoft increased the price of Windows 95
when it introduced Windows 98;1 4 charged $89 for the Windows 98 upgrade
as the "revenue-maximizing price," even though it had found in an internal
study that a price of $49 would have been profitable; 0 5 and charged different
prices to different OEMs. 0 6 In each of these instances, it concluded
Microsoft's pricing behavior was consistent with monopoly power.1° 7 But because it did not indicate what a competitive price for Windows might be, it is
impossible to find that the price was monopolistic. The District Court's hesitancy to pinpoint a competitive price is understandable: in software markets,
because of the necessarily high costs of research and development and low
costs of production, no firm can survive by setting its price at marginal cost.
How much higher a price can be than marginal cost and still be considered
"competitive" is uncertain in practice if not in theory.
The crucial point about these findings, however, is that they were made
in the context of the District Court's inquiry into whether Microsoft possessed monopoly power, not its inquiry into whether Microsoft illegally maintained its power. The government did not allege-and indeed could not
allege, consistently with its 1995 Microsoft consent decree' 0 3-that Microsoft
had acquired its monopoly power unlawfully. The same network effects that
create the applications barrier to entry also cause markets to tip toward a
single dominant supplier that obtains an early lead. 10 9 There was nothing in
102

Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (Findings of Fact

103

ROBERT H. BoRK, THE A,

66).

rrrrRusT PARADOX: A POLICY

AT WAR WrrH ITSELF

140

(1978).
104

Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (Findings of Fact T 62).

105 Id. (Findings of Fact 1 63).
106 Id. (Findings of Fact 64).
107 United States v. Microsoft Corp.,

87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 37 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions of
Law), affd in par rev'd in partper curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).

108 In upholding the decree, the D.C. Circuit stated:
The government believes that Microsoft's initial acquisition of monopoly power in
the operating systems market was the somewhat fortuitous result of IBM choosing
for its PCs the operating system introduced by Microsoft ("MS-DOS"), which, with
Microsoft's successful exploitation of that advantage, led Microsoft to obtain an
installed base on millions of IBM, and IBM-compatible, PCs.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
109 The government recognized this in earlier litigation against Microsoft. See John E.
Lopatka & William H. Page, Microsoft; Monopolization, and Network Externalities: Some Uses
and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision Making, 40 ANrITusT BULL. 317, 354

(1995) (quoting affidavit of Kenneth Arrow).
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the record to suggest that the market's tilt toward Windows was the result of
monopolistic practices; indeed, the court found that "Windows 95 enjoyed
unprecedented popularity with consumers," 0 suggesting that the attractiveness of the product was the decisive factor. Some have contended in other
litigations that Microsoft's monopoly power was achieved unlawfully 1 11-a
point we return to below-but the government and Judge Jackson are not
among them.
Nor can we find, based upon the District Court's opinions, that
Microsoft's actions enhanced the price of the browser. On the contrary, the
findings explicitly recognize that "Microsoft sought to increase the product's
share of browser usage by giving it away for free. In many cases, Microsoft
also gave other firms things of value (at substantial cost to Microsoft) in exchange for their commitment to distribute and promote Internet Explorer,
sometimes explicitly at Navigator's expense."" 2 In the same vein, the District Court observed:
Despite the opportunity to make a substantial amount of revenue
from the sale of Internet Explorer, and with the knowledge that the

dominant browser product on the market, Navigator, was being licensed at a price, senior executives at Microsoft decided that
Microsoft needed to give its browser away in furtherance of the
larger strategic goal of accelerating Internet Explorer's acquisition

of browser usage share. Consequently, Microsoft decided not to
charge an increment in price when it included Internet Explorer in
Windows for the first time, and it has continued this policy ever
since. In addition, Microsoft has never charged for an Internet Explorer license when it is distributed separately from Windows. 113
Thus, the District Court unequivocally recognized that IE is free in all chan-

nels of distribution. 114 It even found that the real price of IE may be negative

if one takes account of advertising, free services, and subsidies Microsoft has
115
provided to promote IE.
Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (Findings of Fact I8).
See, e.g., Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1299-1301 (D. Utah 1999)
(denying Microsoft's motion for summary judgment).
112 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (Findings of Fact
136).
113 Id. (Findings of Fact
137); see also id. at 62 (Findings of Fact 250) ("Microsoft licensed the [IE Access Kit] including Internet Explorer, to IAPs at no charge.").
114 The D.C. Circuit reversed the District Court's holding that Microsoft illegally tied the
browser to the operating system. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 96 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (per curiam) (en bane), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001). In a confusing passage on
"price bundling," the D.C. Circuit said that the interpretation of the District Court opinion we
offer in the text is not entirely clear, noting "the tension between Findings of Fact
136-37,
which Microsoft interprets as saying that no part of the bundled price of Windows can be attributed to IE, and Conclusions of Law, at 50, which says the opposite." Id.
115 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (Findings of Fact 139) ("Not only was Microsoft willing
to forego an opportunity to attract substantial revenue while enhancing (albeit temporarily) consumer demand for Windows 98, but the company also paid huge sums of money, and sacrificed
many millions more in lost revenue every year, in order to induce firms to take actions that
would help increase Internet Explorer's share of browser usage at Navigator's expense."); see
also id. at 58 (Findings of Fact 231) ("First, Microsoft rewarded with valuable consideration
those large-volume OEMs that took steps to promote Internet Explorer. For example,
110
"'l
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The District Court did find that "[t]he fact that Microsoft ostensibly
priced Internet Explorer at zero does not detract from the conclusion that
consumers were forced to pay, one way or another, for the browser along
with Windows."'1 16 It continued: "licensees, including consumers, are forced

to take, and pay for, the entire package of software and... any value to be
ascribed to Internet Explorer is built into this single price. ' 117 Notice that
the District Court did not say that the price is higher as a result of the inclusion of IE; to do so would contradict its finding that IE has always been
included in Windows at no increment in price. Instead, it suggested that the
"binding" was unlawful even though there was no increment in price because
the consumer was forced to take something of value. 118
Thus, the District Court did not hold that Microsoft's conduct has yet
increased prices or reduced output, the most tangible forms of consumer
harm. It did, however, identify other forms of immediate consumer harm.
The District Court stated, for example, that Microsoft injured some consumers by failing to provide them with Windows without a browser because some
wanted no browser and some only wanted Navigator; to the District Court,
these consumers were hurt because the inclusion of IE unnecessarily consumed system resources, hindered the performance of Navigator, and created
confusion. 119

2. Innovation
Despite its conclusion that Microsoft had benefited consumers by reducing prices, the District Court held that Microsoft's actions had caused "serious and far-reaching, consumer harm by distorting competition."' 2 0 The
primary distortion was harm to innovation-principally the deterrence of the
evolution of a competing platform. Interestingly, the District Court did not
Microsoft gave reductions in the royalty price of Windows to certain OEMs, including Gateway,
that set Internet Explorer as the default browser on their PC systems. In 1997, Microsoft gave
still further reductions to those OEMs that displayed Internet Explorer's logo and links to

Microsoft's Internet Explorer update page on their own home pages. That same year, Microsoft
agreed to give OEMs millions of dollars in co-marketing funds, as well as costly in-kind assis-

tance, in exchange for their carrying out other promotional activities for Internet Explorer.); id.
at 37 (Findings of Fact 141) ("[H]ad Microsoft not viewed browser usage share as the key to
preserving the applications barrier to entry, the company would not have taken its efforts be-

yond developing a competitive browser product, including it with Windows at no additional cost
to consumers, and promoting it with advertising. Microsoft would not have absorbed the considerable additional costs associated with enlisting other firms in its campaign to increase Internet
Explorer's usage share at Navigator's expense.). The District Court found that Compaq paid
lower prices because it favored IE, id. at 59 (Findings of Fact 234), and Gateway paid higher

prices because it favored Navigator, id. (Findings of Fact 1 236). The court also found that
Microsoft charged a lower price to LAPs for inclusion in the Microsoft Referral Server than it
could have. Id. at 63-64 (Findings of Fact 255).
116 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions of
Law), affd in part, rev'd in part per curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,

122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
117 Id. (emphasis added).
118 Id. (arguing that the purpose of prohibiting tying "is not, as Microsoft suggests, simply
to punish firms on the basis of an increment in price attributable to the tied product").
119 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (Findings of Fact 410).
120 Id. (Findings of Fact 409).
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hold that Microsoft entirely suppressed innovation. Indeed, it found that
Microsoft was highly innovative and had every incentive to innovate despite
its monopoly power.121 The District Court recognized that a major part of
Microsoft's campaign to build market share was by innovation in its browser
technology. 2 2 This innovation in turn spurred Netscape to improve Navigator "at a competitive rate": 123
The inclusion of Internet Explorer with Windows at no separate
charge increased general familiarity with the Internet and reduced
the cost to the public of gaining access to it, at least in part because
it compelled Netscape to stop charging for Navigator. These actions
thus contributed to improving the quality of Web browsing
software, lowering its cost, and increasing its availability, thereby
124
benefitting consumers.
These improvements in Navigator's browser occurred despite its lost revenues from being forced to price at zero and its higher costs from being relegated to less efficient channels of distribution.
Despite these improvements, however, Microsoft's actions prevented
Netscape from making at least some improvements in its browser. They "deterred Netscape from undertaking technical innovations that it might otherwise have implemented in Navigator."'' 2 Most important, the District Court
concluded that Microsoft had harmed consumers indirectly by skewing innovation away from platform competition. 126 Microsoft's successful reduction
in Netscape's usage share-even though Netscape's installed base doubled in
absolute terms-had convinced developers that Netscape would never be the
standard Web browser, and that applications would have to be written to
Windows APIs: 27 "Navigator's installed base may continue to grow, but Internet Explorer's installed base is now larger and growing faster. Consequently, the APIs that Navigator exposes will not attract enough developer
attention to spawn a body of cross-platform, network-centric applications
large enough to dismantle the applications barrier to entry."'128 As a
consequence,
[t]he actions that Microsoft took against Navigator hobbled a form
of innovation that had shown the potential to depress the applications barrier to entry sufficiently to enable other firms to compete
effectively against Microsoft in the market for Intel-compatible PC
operating systems. That competition would have conduced to con129
sumer choice and nurtured innovation.
Id. at 17-18 (Findings of Fact 61).
Id. at 35 (Findings of Fact 135).
123 Id. at 102 (Findings of Fact
408) ("The debut of Internet Explorer and its rapid improvement gave Netscape an incentive to improve Navigator's quality at a competitive rate.").
124 Id.
125 Id. at 94-95 (Findings of Fact 1 379).
126 Id. at 103 (Findings of Fact 1 411).
127 Id. at 94 (Findings of Fact 1 374, 378).
128 Id. (Findings of Fact 7 378).
129 Id. at 103 (Findings of Fact
411) (emphasis added). The D.C. Circuit affirmed liability
for monopoly maintenance on the ground of harm to innovation. United States v. Microsoft
121

122

HeinOnline -- 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 846 2000-2001

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol 69:829

The conclusion is the same: Microsoft successfully deflected any possible effort by developers to write applications to the emerging Navigator and Java
platforms. Although Microsoft was highly innovative and benefited consumers (and presumably harmed Netscape) by its innovations, its unlawful actions also harmed both consumers and Netscape by deterring-to an
indeterminate extent-innovations that might have threatened its operating
system monopoly.
IV.

Who Suffered Antitrust Injury in Microsoft?

Up to this point, we have identified the standards for antitrust injury and
examined Microsoft's conduct, both beneficial and harmful, as it was depicted by the District Court. We now turn to an examination of whether
consumers, OEMs, and competitors have suffered antitrust injury. Although
we cannot resolve anything definitively, an examination of the issue of antitrust injury can perhaps indicate where most of the critical factual issues remain. Antitrust injury frames the damage inquiry by identifying the sorts of
harms that bear the necessary connection to the anticompetitive aspect of
Microsoft's conduct.
A.

Consumers

The most straightforward way in which consumers could suffer antitrust
injury would be by paying an illegal overcharge. Of course, even if such an
overcharge occurred, consumers would have to avoid the Illinois Brick rule,
138 Most
which bars the indirect purchaser from recovering for an overcharge.
consumers acquired Windows indirectly, primarily from OEMs, whose injury
we discuss in the next part. Already, some consumer class actions have been
dismissed in federal court, largely on Illinois Brick grounds. 139 Nevertheless,

any passed-on overcharge would constitute antitrust injury, so the issue of
whether consumers have suffered such an overcharge remains an important
issue in state indirect purchaser suits.' 40 More important, resolution of the
issue is important in framing the overall inquiry into competitive and private
harm.

Proof of an overcharge based upon the current findings would require a
conclusion that Microsoft's illegal actions caused a higher monopoly price
than would otherwise have been the case. Only the increment in the monopoly price attributable to illegal activity would constitute an overcharge.' 41 As
IM. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
139 In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2001).
138

140 See, e.g., Microsoft I-V Cases, No. J.C.C.P No. 4106 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 2000)
(order certifying consumer class actions); Melnick v. Microsoft Corp., Nos. CV-99-709, CV-99-

752 (Me. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2001) (refusing to certify an indirect purchaser class). For discus-

sion of the practical and policy problems posed by such suits, see William H. Page, The Limits of
State IndirectPurchaserSuits: Class Certificationin the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 A'rurrrrUsT

LJ. 1 (1999).
141

Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[A] purchaser

may recover only for the price increment that 'flows from' the distortion of the market caused by
the monopolist's anticompetitive conduct."). For criticism of the Berkey standard, see James R.
McCall, The Disaggregationof DamagesRequirement in PrivateMonopolizationActions, 62 No-
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Microsoft thus inhibited the evolution of Navigator into a competitor
that might-have eventually threatened the Windows monopoly. Judge Jackson specifically refused to find that "absent Microsoft's actions, Navigator
and Java already would have ignited genuine competition in the market for
Intel-compatible PC operating systems.' 130 He did hold, however, that
"Microsoft has retarded, and perhaps altogether extinguished, the process by
which these two middleware technologies could have facilitated the introduction of competition into an important market."' 131 In addition, Judge Jackson
found that Microsoft's restrictions on OEMs' alterations in the boot sequence of Windows hampered innovation that might have benefited
132
consumers.
AOL's acquisition of Netscape did not, in Judge Jackson's view, appreciably change the likely effect of Microsoft's actions on platform competition.
AOL agreed with Microsoft to use IE technology as the basis for its default
browser in return for placement on the Windows desktop. 133 That deal accounted for a substantial part of Netscape's drop in usage share. AOL later
acquired Netscape.' 34 Nevertheless, the acquisition was not, according to the
District Court, of much competitive significance in the operating system market. AOL made the deal, not in order to compete with Microsoft in the
browser market, but to use Netscape's Netcenter web portal to funnel users
to AOL. 35 The District Court found that AOL apparently has no plans or
much incentive to develop Navigator as a platform. 36 Its acquisition of Netscape was justifiable solely on the grounds of its usage share and will remain
so even if that share continues to decline.
Thus, the District Court found that AOL would likely not switch to Navigator and try to develop it as a platform even after expiration of the AOLMicrosoft deal:
Even if, despite the absence of signs to that effect, AOL drops Internet Explorer and adopts Navigator with a mind to reviving Navigator's usage share after January 1, 2001, Navigator's
transformation into a platform attractive enough to threaten the applications barrier would be a chimerical aspiration, especially considering Microsoft's increasing influence over network-centric
standards. In any event, nothing that happens after January 1, 2001
will change the fact that Microsoft has succeeded in forestalling for
several years Navigator's evolution in that direction. 37
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (en banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001)
(noting that a monopolist violates section 2 of the Sherman Act by aiming exclusionary conduct
"at providers of nascent competitive technologies").
130

Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 103 (Findings of Fact

131

Id.
Id. at 50, 60 (Findings of Fact 1

132

411).

203, 241).

133 Id. at 72 (Findings of Fact 1

288-89).
134 Id. at 75 (Findings of Fact I 299).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 75-76 (Findings of Fact
302).
137 Ild. at 97 (Findings of Fact 383).
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we have seen, the District Court's opinion stopped short of saying that
Microsoft charged a monopoly price of any kind, and it did not suggest that
Microsoft's illegal conduct has increased prices over a lawful monopoly level.
Indeed, the repeated references in the record to Microsoft's provision of IE
at no charge in Windows and in the Referral Server suggest that prices, to
this point at any rate, may have been lower because of the illegal campaign.
Judge Jackson stated, for example, that Microsoft "expended wealth and forsworn opportunities" in ways that were not profit-maximizing except as a
means of exclusion, and consequently were predatory.142 He found that,
even though Netscape was charging for Navigator in 1995,'143 Microsoft chose
to offer its browser for free, sacrificing "the opportunity to make a substantial amount of revenue from the sale of Internet Explorer... in furtherance
of the larger strategic goal of accelerating Internet Explorer's acquisition of
browser usage share."' 144 This characterization of Microsoft's actions sounds
very much like predatory pricing-a practice that the Supreme Court has
recognized is beneficial to consumers in the short run.145
Thus, for consumers to prove an overcharge, they must apparently take
one of two paths. First, they could try to prove that Microsoft indeed gained
monopoly power illegally before 1995. As we pointed out above, the government did not make such an allegation; indeed, it indicated in its settlement of
an earlier case that Microsoft had not illegally acquired its monopoly. 46 In
the Caldera litigation, however, a private plaintiff contended that Microsoft
had acquired its operating system monopoly illegally by excluding DR-DOS,
a competitor of its earlier MS-DOS operating system. 47 While that case was
settled without a decision on the merits, some consumer class plaintiffs have
made similar allegations about exclusion or "technologically superior and
lower cost" competing operating systems like DR-DOS and IBM's OS/2.148
If Microsoft did acquire its monopoly illegally, then consumers could allege
mn DAME L. REv. 643 (1987). For further discussion of proof of overcharges in monopolization
cases, see ANrrRusr LAW SECrION, AM. BAR ASS'N, PROVING ANTrrRuST DAMAGES: LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC IssuEs 202-03 (William H. Page ed., 1996).
142 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions of
Law), affd in part,rev'd in partper curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
143 For example, in the LAP channel, it charged between $15 and $20. United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 62 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact 250), affd in part, rev'd
in part per curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
144 Id.at 35 (Findings of Fact 137).
145 See, e.g., Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,224
(1993) ("Even if the ultimate effect of the cut is to induce or reestablish supracompetitive pricing, discouraging a price cut and forcing firms to maintain supracompetitive prices, thus depriving consumers of the benefits of lower prices in the interim, does not constitute sound antitrust
policy."). The D.C. Circuit in Microsoft noted, "we know there is no claim of price predation."
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (en banc), cert.
denied, 122 S.Ct. 350 (2001).
146 See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network Externalities:Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decision Making, 40 ANri.
TRUsT BuLL.317, 333 (1995).
147 Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1299-1301 (D. Utah 1999) (denying Microsoft's motion for summary judgment).
148 In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 706 (D. Md. 2001).
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that the present price of Windows represents an overcharge in relation to
price that would have prevailed absent the much earlier monopolistic
conduct.
Such a task would be complicated. First of all, the District Court found
that Microsoft was charging less than it could, in part to spur growth of the
PC market. 149 This finding suggest that the price of Windows may not be
higher now than the price of the hypothetical operating system that may have
emerged absent Microsoft's actions. Given the winner-take-most character
of the market, which the District Court recognized, it is likely that any operating system that succeeded would have gained a measure of monopoly
power. If so, it might have charged a higher price than Microsoft is currently
charging for Windows. Of course, if Microsoft excluded a better product,
consumers could have suffered harm even if the price of Windows is no
higher than the price of the excluded operating system. The relevant comparison is between quality-adjusted prices. But quality differences for a
product that was never allowed to evolve would likely be difficult to
establish.
The second path to proof of an overcharge would lie in the District
Court's holding that Microsoft's actions since 1995 have deterred the development of cross-platform technologies that might have eroded the Windows
monopoly. 150 A consumer plaintiff could allege that, absent Microsoft's illegal activities, Netscape and Java would have emerged as a new platform that
would have commoditized the underlying operating system. As we saw in the
discussion of innovation, however, the District Court refused to hold that a
genuine platform competitor would have emerged absent Microsoft's actions.151 Franklin Fisher, one of the government's economic expert witnesses,

when asked whether consumers had been harmed by Microsoft's conduct
replied:
That's very hard to know. The reason that it's mostly hard-on balance, I would think the answer was no, up to this point. The reason
for that is that Microsoft has used its power to protect its operating
system's monopoly from a threat that might not have materialized
by this time anyway. And, in doing that, it has given away a lot of
things.

152

He added that consumers were harmed by Microsoft's discouragement
of innovation that threatened the Microsoft monopoly, but added "those effects have only just begun."' 5 3 Even if new evidence would make such a "but
for" world plausible, however, it would still be necessary to prove that the
competitors would have charged less than Microsoft is currently charging or
149

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact

65), affid in part, rev'd in partper curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122

S. Ct. 350 (2001).
150 See, e.g., id. at 103 (Findings of Fact 411).
151 Id. (Findings of Fact 1 411).
152 Transcript of Testimony of Franklin Fisher at 29-30, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65
F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233) (emphasis added), http://www.microsoft.
conrlpresspass/trial/transcripts/an99/01-12-am.asp.
153 Id. at 30.
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offered greater value. Such a theory is not implausible: if a new technology
were to displace Windows as the standard platform, one would expect that it
would offer significant advantages. But the problems of proving harm to innovation without resort to speculation are formidable.
Another district court has recently held that consumers would have no
standing to sue Microsoft for harms to innovation.' 54 That court recognized
that "since businesses compete through both lower prices and superior performance, a firm's stifling of innovative products would cause antitrust injury."'15 5 Nevertheless, it held that such claims would have to be brought by
some firm that was demonstrably excluded. Consumers' harms, without such
a showing, would be impossible to measure:
[A]n evidentiary record need not be established to perceive the selfevident proposition that it would be entirely speculative and beyond
the competence of a judicial proceeding to create in hindsight a
technological universe that never came into existence. It would be
even more speculative to determine the relative benefits and detriments that non-Microsoft products would have brought to the market and the relative monetary value of Microsoft and non-Microsoft
56
products to a diffuse population of end users.
While we do not necessarily endorse this view of antitrust standing, the court
was surely correct that it would be difficult for consumers to prove harm on
this theory.
Judge Jackson did specifically find that consumers suffered immediate
harm from a loss in system performance in being forced to take a browser
that they did not want. 157 The difficulty with his conclusion lies in establishing that the harm is linked to any anticompetitive effect of Microsoft's conduct. It is not obviously a part of any monopolistic overcharge. It is a cost
imposed on consumers, but it is not clear that it had an exclusionary effect.
The illegal tie would have been just as effective in excluding Netscape, if not
more so, had the inclusion of IE been entirely beneficial to consumers.
Moreover, consumers who prefer to have an operating system with no
browser at all are not deterred from acquiring one from Netscape, so any
harm to them is irrelevant to exclusion. This harm does not constitute anti158
trust injury.
B.

OEMs

As direct purchasers of Windows, OEMs could claim that they paid an
overcharge for Windows. Like consumers, they might attempt to prove that
Microsoft acquired monopoly power illegally by its actions before 1995 and
that a lower price would now prevail but for that conduct. Alternatively,
154 In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711 (D. Md. 2001).

Id.
Id.
157 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 102 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact
410), aff'd in part,rev'd in partper curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
15S In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 712 (D. Md. 2001).
155
156
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OEMs could assert that they were forced to pay an overcharge as a result of
Microsoft's unlawful maintenance of monopoly power after 1995 by its actions against the platform threat of Netscape and Java. The latter theory
would require an OEM to establish the price it would have paid but for
Microsoft's exclusionary practices for a "commoditized" operating system as
well as the price it would have paid for the middleware that would have commoditized the operating system by replacing it as an applications platform.
Then, the OEM would have to establish the proper actual price for purposes
of calculating the incremental overcharge. The OEMs' task in all of this
would be difficult, for reasons we discussed in the last part-under both overcharge theories, projection of a but-for world would be highly speculative.
The OEMs' task would be easier than the task of consumer plaintiffs in one
respect: they would not have to overcome or circumvent the Illinois Brick
hurdle. But it would be more difficult in another respect.
OEMs were participants in some of the schemes the District Court
found Microsoft implemented to exclude platform competitors. 5 9 This fact
complicates the determination of the actual price OEMs paid for Windows,
and therefore the calculation of any overcharge. OEMs performed many services for Microsoft, some of which were unlawfully exclusionary in the Dis160
trict Court's view and some of which were legitimately competitive.
Microsoft compensated OEMs for these services in various ways, by offering
royalty discounts, in-kind assistance, and marketing allowances. 6 1 The District Court suggested that one of the reasons Microsoft did not charge a
higher monopoly price was that it exerted its monopoly in part by inducing
OEMs to accept restrictive and exclusionary licensing terms. 162 Thus, it
found that "Microsoft expends a significant portion of its monopoly power,
which could otherwise be spent maximizing price, on imposing burdensome
restrictions on its customers-and in inducing them to behave in ways-that
augment and prolong that monopoly power.' 1 63 As we pointed out earlier,
this observation recognizes the fallacy of double counting: Microsoft cannot
both charge a monopoly price for Windows and impose costly restrictions on
OEMs. Post-Chicago theories of exclusion also recognize that the dominant
firm must in effect buy off dealers to induce them to participate in an exclusionary arrangement. 164 The District Court's implication is that the realprice
159 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 39, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Unlawful exclusionary practices can be unilateral, as in the case of predatory pricing, or they can be bilateral, as
in the case of exclusive dealing arrangements. Because the OEMs' participation "was not voluntary in any meaningful sense," it would not bar their recovery. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
160 The District Court's remedial order prohibited many competitive discounts to OEMs
but excepted from the prohibition allowances for legitimate costs of distribution services, such as
volume discounts. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 66 (D.D.C. 2000) (Memorandum Order), affid in part, rev'd in part per curiam, en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).

163

Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 58 (Findings of Fact
Id. at 18 (Findings of Fact 66).
Id. at 18-19 (Findings of Fact 66).

164

See Christodoulos Stefanadis, Selective Contracts, Foreclosure,and the Chicago School

161
162

231).

View, 41 J.L. & ECON. 429, 430 (1998) (arguing that anticompetitive foreclosure is possible where
an "upstream incumbent convinces a sufficient number of downstream firms to sign exclusive
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an OEM paid for Windows was the nominal price of the operating system
plus the opportunity cost of succumbing to the exclusionary restrictions.
It bears emphasis that the District Court's point in suggesting that
Microsoft may have been imposing costly restrictions on OEMs was not that
Microsoft's price reflected unlawfully acquired monopoly power. As noted
above, this finding was in the context of its determination that Microsoft possessed monopoly power despite its relatively low prices, not that the monopoly power was illegally acquired. 165 Nevertheless, the District Court's
observation is important if OEMs could show Microsoft acquired its monopoly illegally before 1995 and therefore was exerting unlawful monopoly
power. In that case, its observation indicates that OEMs may have suffered
an overcharge even if the nominal price they paid was close to a competitive
price: Microsoft may simply have been exacting its monopoly price by imposing restrictive conditions. .
The issue becomes more complicated if we assume there was no illegal
monopoly power as of 1995, and Microsoft maintained its monopoly power
illegally after that point, in part by the restrictions imposed on OEMs. In
that case, Microsoft may also have collected an illegal overcharge, if plaintiffs
could prove that a middleware competitor would have emerged and driven
prices down still further, but for the illegal activity. But in that case, OEMs
were one of the primary means by which the monopoly was illegally maintained. As the District Court recognized, OEMs received lower prices in order to induce them to accept the very conditions that deterred the emergence
of middleware platform technology. 166 If Microsoft were successful in
preventing middleware entry by imposing those OEM restrictions, in theory
the compensation that OEMs were paid for participating in that scheme
would have to be offset against any overcharge to OEMs. 167
The offset, of course, would not necessarily be equal to the overcharge.
Collective action problems among OEMs might allow Microsoft to impose
restrictions that return greater monopoly profit than the costs of imposing
the restrictions on OEMs. Moreover, the restrictions on OEMs were not the
only means of exclusion. The District Court found that Microsoft imposed
exclusionary restrictions in other channels of distribution as well.168 But the
supply contracts by offering them low prices"). Stefanadis discusses Eric B. Rasmusen et al.,
Naked Exclusion, 81 AM. EcoN. Rav. 1137 (1991); Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts

as a Barrierto Entry, 77 AM. EcoN. REv. 388 (1987); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman,
Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. EcoN. REv. 267 (1983); and Steven C. Salop & David T.
Scheffman, Cost-RaisingStrategies, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 19 (1987).
165 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (Findings of Fact
66).
166
167

Id. (Findings of Fact 66).
Analogously, courts have recognized that buyers who are subject to a tying arrangement

can recover damages only if they prove that the sum of the prices of the tied and tying products
was increased. Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 719 (11th Cir.

1984); Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 671 F.2d 1282,1285 (11th Cir. 1982). Unless this condition is
met, the buyer is compensated for any restriction it accepts.
168 See e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 41 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions of Law) (holding restrictions in the IAP channel were anticompetitive), affd in part,rev'd
in part per curiarn en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 350 (2001).
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point remains: any implicit payments for accepting the restrictions must reduce the OEMs' injury in fact.
There are other factors that might complicate the calculation of an overcharge to OEMs. For example, Microsoft offered royalty discounts to OEMs
that promoted IE, for instance by displaying the IE logo and links to the IE
update page on their own home pages. 169 This promotional program was a
lawful competitive arrangement, no different in kind from improving the
quality of IE, even though it may have bolstered Microsoft's market position.
This sort of exclusive provision could not legitimately be considered the
source of any illegal overcharge, even if it contributed to enhancing
Microsoft's monopoly power.
The District Court did find that some of Microsoft's restrictions were
unlawfully exclusionary-but they were not the same for all OEMs. For example, it found that "Compaq committed itself to promote Internet Explorer
exclusively for its PC products" and it in fact "stopped pre-installing Navigator on all but [a] very small percentage of its PCs.' 170 In exchange,
"Microsoft has guaranteed Compaq that the prices it pays for Windows will
171
continue to be significantly lower than the prices paid by other OEMs.'
By contrast, Gateway and IBM refused to promote or distribute IE exclusively, and at least Gateway paid higher prices for Windows than did Compaq. 172 The District Court calculated that other "OEMs would still pay
substantially more than Compaq even if they qualified for all of the royalty
reductions listed in Microsoft's Market Development Agreements.' ' 173 Presumably, the difference in price was in compensation for Compaq's accession
to Microsoft's exclusionary demands and thus reflected the implicit overcharge, but each OEM's situation would be somewhat different. 174
It may be difficult to isolate which restrictions were unlawfully exclusionary. Some of the restrictions were exclusionary, if at all, only because
they were used too extensively. For instance, Microsoft gave OEMs royalty
169 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 58 (Findings of Fact 231).
170 Id. at 58-59 (Findings of Fact 233).
171 Id. at 59 (Findings of Fact 1 234).
172 Id. at 59-60 (Findings of Fact
235-238). The District Court explicitly found that
Gateway "refused... to stop shipping Navigator with its PCs" and "has consistently paid higher
prices for Windows than its competitors." Id. at 59 (Findings of Fact 236). It found that IBM
refused Microsoft's entreaties to promote and distribute IE exclusively, and though it found that
the treatment IBM received from Microsoft was in "stark contrast" to the treatment received by
Compaq, it did not explicitly find that IBM paid a higher royalty than Compaq. Id. at 60 (Findings of Fact 238).
'73 Id. (Findings of Fact
234).
174 This aspect of the findings suggests the possible argument that Microsoft was engaging
in selective contracting as a means of exclusion. See Stefanadis, supra note 164. The argument
would be that Microsoft persuaded a number of OEMs to accept restrictive terms in return for a
guaranteed low price. If enough dealers were thus locked up, Microsoft could deter entry by
preventing competitors from achieving minimum efficient scale. Microsoft could then charge a
monopoly price to the remaining dealers. It is unclear whether the Stefanadis model would
apply to Microsoft's contracts. One condition is that the contracts be offered selectively; if they
are offered to all dealers, then it is unclear that the prediction of anticompetitive exclusion holds.
In Microsoft, apparently all dealers were offered the exclusive arrangements, but not all accepted. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
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discounts for making IE the default browser. 175 A "default" by nature implies exclusivity, and purchasing the right to be the default product, assuming
such a right has substantial competitive significance, could possibly be
deemed exclusionary only if it foreclosed a competitor from an undue share
of the market of OEMs selling default status. In theory, then, only some of
the royalty discount received for making 1E the default browser would be
disregarded in calculating actual prices paid, but determining the appropriate
proportion might be impossible. Similar problems plague restrictions like the
prohibition on changing the Windows boot sequence or installing programs
that would launch automatically upon completion of the initial boot sequence. 176 They are not unambiguously anticompetitive.

Further, had OEMs been able to do so, they would certainly have tried
to sell exclusive rights to be the browser on the first desktop the consumer
saw.' 77 Microsoft effectively paid OEMs to keep IE on the desktop and accessible to consumers rather than to make Navigator the sole browser. These
restrictions were not explicitly exclusive because they did not prevent OEMs
from adding Navigator along with IE.178 However, the District Court suggested that they were implicitly exclusionary because OEMs wanted to avoid
79
the support costs associated with multiple browsers on a single system.
Whether compensation for retaining IE on the desktop should be treated as
payment for an anticompetitive service is problematic. 180
C. Competitors
If Microsoft only imposed an illegal overcharge on OEMs, that action
would not harm competitors-indeed, they would benefit because the higher
price would presumably allow them likewise to charge a higher price or to
sell more of their product. In the case of potential competitors, it would
facilitate their entry into the market by making their products relatively
cheaper than Microsoft's products. So, for a competitor plaintiff to be successful, it must show that its harm was the result of an illegally exclusionary
activity. As we indicated earlier, an unlawfully excluded competitor is entitled to damages because its profit on the excluded output corresponds to an
output restriction caused by the offender. However, it is essential for the
court to distinguish and segregate this sort of harm from the harms associated
with lawful competition.
175 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 58 (Findings of Fact
231, 233).
176 See, e.g., id. at 52 (Findings of Fact
213).
177 See David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty,and Stability in AntitrustLaw, 16 BERELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 802 (2001) ("[C]onsumer indifference [between browsers] would imply a
profit opportunity for OEMs, who could sell exclusive preinstallation rights to the highest
bidder.").
178 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (Fimdings of Fact 217).
179 See id. (Findings of Fact 217).
180 An OEM could simplify its claim by ignoring the opportunity cost of exclusionary restrictions. It would accordingly use the nominal price paid for Windows as the actual price in
calculating the overcharge regardless of any discount received for anticompetitive services,
though of course it would still confront the imposing task of establishing the appropriate competitive but-for price.
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Rivals whose existing products were excluded would be most likely to
recover on this theory. For example, we mentioned Caldera's DR-DOS and
IBM's OS/2 in the section on consumer plaintiffs. Caldera's suit has been
settled, but presumably IBM or the producer of any other excluded technology could sue, if it were able to overcome problems with the statute of limitations. As we have seen, however, Judge Jackson's findings of fact offer no
support for any such theory.
According to Judge Jackson, the competitors most clearly affected by
Microsoft's conduct beginning in 1995 are Netscape and Sun Microsystems. 181 We focus here on Netscape, although the issues involving both firms
are similar. 182 Again, only harm from anticompetitive exclusion is compensable as antitrust injury. For example, Judge Jackson found that Microsoft's
actions "compelled Netscape to stop charging for Navigator," but that this
effect "contributed to improving the quality of Web browsing software, lowering its cost, and increasing its availability, thereby benefiting consumers."'18 3 Consequently, the lost revenue from charging for Navigator cannot
be the measure of antitrust injury. The private harm that would be most
directly linked to the harm to competition alleged by the government would
be profits Netscape lost as a result of being excluded as a platform
competitor.
The District Court held that Microsoft had hampered the development
of Navigator, both limiting its success in its current market and preventing it
from evolving into a platform competitor. 84 Further, it unequivocally held
that Microsoft had harmed Netscape by raising its costs and changing the
relative usage shares of Navigator and IE: although Netscape's installed base
doubled between 1996 and 1998, from 15 million to over 33 million,
Microsoft's base increased much faster.185 The District Court found that Netscape's total usage share had dropped from seventy percent to below fifty
percent, while Microsoft's share had increased from five percent to around
fifty percent, 186 and that "these trends will continue."'187
On the issue of causation, Judge Jackson said:
This reversal of fortune might not have occurred had Microsoft not
improved the quality of Internet Explorer, and some part of the re181 The District Court identified other competing, middleware threats, including those
posed by Notes, distributed first by Lotus and then by IBM, Intel's Native Signal Processing
software, and the multimedia playback technologies of Apple and RealNetworks. Microsoft, 65
F. Supp. 2d at 21-22 (Findings of Fact 78). But the principal rivals in the court's view were
Netscape's Navigator and Sun's Java. Id. (Findings of Fact 7 77).
182 Just as Microsoft's attack on Netscape's browser enhanced efficiency in some respects,
so did its attack on Sun's Java technologies. Microsoft's Java development undermined Java's
cross-platform promise by relying on "native calls" to Windows code. While these actions may
have blunted Java's threat as a competitor, they also made programs written in Microsoft's Java
implementation run faster. Id. at 97 (Findings of Fact 389). The tradeoffs between the two
effects should be accounted for in any damage calculation.
183 I& at 103 (Findings of Fact
408).
184 Id. at 93-94 (Findings of Fact
372, 378).
185 Id. at 94 (Findings of Fact 91378).

186

Id. at 93 (Findings of Fact

187

Id. (Findings of Fact

91372).

91373).
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versal is undoubtedly attributable to Microsoft's decision to distribute Internet Explorer with Windows at no additional charge.
The relative shares would not have changed nearly as much as they
did, however, had Microsoft not devoted its monopoly power and
monopoly profits to precisely that end. 188
The District Court thus recognized that (1) Netscape's share may not have
declined at all if IE had remained an inferior product, 189 and (2) Netscape's
share would have declined to some extent even if Microsoft had only attacked Netscape by lawful competitive means, like improving its browser and
offering it at no separate charge.' 9 0 Nevertheless, it found that Microsoft's
illegal actions have caused Netscape's share to decline far more than it would
have in the absence of those actions. 191 Thus, the District Court invited segregation of three causal factors: illegal exclusionary conduct (E); the improvements in Microsoft's browser (L); and the zero price of Microsoft's
browser (F). It seemed to have found the causal relationships to be something like this:
Usage Share
70%

SE

50%

S ,

1995

1998

Time

In this diagram, S refers to Netscape's usage share, and the subscripts
indicate causal factors at work in the share. Had Microsoft only engaged in
exclusionary practices without improving its product, Netscape's share (designated SE) would have remained constant at around seventy percent, because IE would have been so inferior, no one would use it. Had Microsoft
only competed lawfully, Netscape's share (SLF) would have declined to some
extent, because at least some consumers would prefer it. But the present
(and future) declines (shown as SELF) are the result of all three causal factors.
According to the District Court, the declines were both a manifestation
and a cause of competitive harm to Netscape. First, although competition
from Microsoft led Netscape to improve its browser, the zero pricing and the
denial of access to th" most efficient means of distribution "inflicted considerable harm on Netscape's business" and "deterred Netscape from undertaking technical innovations that it might otherwise have implemented in
Navigator."' 92 These declines may also have prevented Netscape from devel358).
Id at 93-94 (Findings of Fact 1 375).
Id. at 94 (Findings of Fact 376).
Id. (Findings of Fact 1 376).
Id. at 94-95 (Findings of Fact 379).

188 Id at 89 (Findings of Fact

189
190
191
192
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oping its browser into a platform that would rival Windows, at least for several years, if not permanently. Presumably, Netscape's development as a
platform would have been slowed to some extent by lawful competition
alone; but it was slowed for several years by all three causal factors.
The most ambitious theory of damages that Netscape might offer would
be its lost profits as a successful platform competitor of Microsoft. Indeed, if
Bill Gates's fear that Netscape would commoditize the underlying operating
system had actually come true, the browser would be the dominant platform
to which applications would be written. This theory, of course, faces the initial difficulty that the District Court did not find that Netscape would have
actually become an effective platform competitor by the time the case was
decided. 193 Nevertheless, the District Court said that Microsoft had at least
delayed that possibility by persuading developers that Netscape would not be
a standard to which applications could be written.194 In principle, Netscape
could prove that it would have become a platform competitor. If so, it might
claim the difference between its profits as a platform competitor and its present profits.
This theory faces a number of practical difficulties. First, the District
Court's refusal to find anything specific about the prospects of the Netscape
platform shows that any such theory is speculative. There seems to be no
way for any better proof to be developed that such a counterfactual sequence
of events would have occurred with any confidence. Netscape, as plaintiff,
would also certainly be met by the testimony of its chief executive, James
Barksdale, that the company never believed Navigator could displace Windows as a platform. 195 Further complicating matters, any theory of damages
would have to account for the effects of lawful competition in delaying the
development of the Netscape platform. All of the causal factors must be
segregated and supported by evidence that meets the appropriate standard of
proof. If Microsoft's lawful competition alone had caused a drop in usage
share, it presumably would have delayed evolution of Navigator into a platform, to some extent. In addition, the time frame would have to recognize
that any structural or injunctive relief in the government case would presumptively remove any obstacles to the evolution of the browser-once
Microsoft's thumb is removed from the competitive scales, Netscape could
resume its evolution.
Most important, it would be problematic for Netscape to claim monopoly profits. The reliance of the government's case on network effects suggests the possibility that Netscape might claim that the market would have
193 In oral arguments on appeal, the D.C. Circuit expressed concern about the proof of
causation. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,78-80 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (en
banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001). The only evidence that Netscape would have developed into a platform competitor is Bill Gates's apparent fear that it would do so. Nevertheless,
the D.C. Circuit affirmed the District Court's holding on monopoly maintenance, applying (for
liability) an "edentulous" theory of causation. Id.
194 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 103 (Findings of Fact 411).
195 Transcript of Testimony of James Barksdale at 72-74, United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
65 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (Nos. 8-1232, 98-1233), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/
transcripts/oct98/10-20-pm.asp. He characterized Netscape founder Marc Andersen's statements
to the contrary as "a joke." Id. at 73.
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tipped to its platform. The entire theory of the government's case is that
competition would be introduced into the operating system market but for
Microsoft's illegal actions. It would be incongruous (and perhaps inconsistent with antitrust injury) to claim monopoly profits from successfully displacing Microsoft as a monopolist.
If Netscape were unable to prove that it would have displaced Microsoft
as the standard platform, it could still perhaps argue that it lost profits as a
result of its drop in usage share. A loss in usage share is not by itself anticompetitive and so would not necessarily constitute antitrust injury standing
alone. But one might argue that this decline is linked to a reduced
probability of the entry of platform competition. Even if it cannot be proven
that entry would have occurred with sufficient certainty to justify damages
for Netscape as a platform competitor, the decline in usage share might be
sufficiently linked to prospective anticompetitive effects to provide a basis
for damages. Once again, however, it would be crucial to segregate the effects of Microsoft's legal and illegal competitive actions in calculating
damages.
V.

Conclusion

Now that the D.C. Circuit has affirmed the District Court's determination that Microsoft illegally maintained its monopoly of operating systems,
albeit on somewhat different grounds, the prospect of private lawsuits is all
the more real. Future courts will have to grapple with complex issues of antitrust injury for several different categories of private plaintiffs. Moreover,
Microsoft is the most important monopolization case of the last two decades.
An examination of the competitive harms to various actors as a result of
Microsoft's actions sheds light on the role and meaning of antitrust injury
generally.
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